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Abstract
Social choice theory is concerned with developing and evaluating voting
systems, both for the use of political and organizational elections and for
use as decision making process for multiagent systems. Particularly in the
context of multiagent systems, computational resistance to various types
of control has become a desired property of a voting system. Though ma-
nipulative actions may always be possible, strong computational barriers
to efficient control can give us sufficient confidence in the integrity of an
election.
Range Voting is a natural extension of approval voting that is resistant
to a large number of cases of control. In particular, the variant Normalized




Many of the key results in voting theory show that all voting systems are
flawed in some way. Arrow’s impossibility theorem states that that in any
election with more than two candidates any voting system will disobey
at least one of several reasonable and natural criteria [1]. The Gibbard-
Satterthwaite and Duggan-Schwartz theorems show that all reasonable
voting systems are susceptible to strategic voting, where a voter votes
counter to their true preferences in order to achieve a better outcome [22]
[27] [12]. A dishonest election organizer might always be able to subtly
alter the election to achieve their desired end. Thus, much of the subse-
quent study of voting systems has been directed towards finding the best
compromises and most reasonable, if imperfect solutions.
The concept of election control represents cases where the authority
conducting the election attempts to alter the outcome by changing the
structure of the election. The study of control of elections was initiated
by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [3], who also introduced a novel defense
against it. Even if control is possible, it may be computationally very dif-
ficult to find an ideal plan. The standard tools of complexity theory can
be brought to bear on the problem and help to restore confidence in elec-
tion systems. In many cases, a control problem can be shown to be NP-
1
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hard and therefore very unlikely to be solvable in polynomial time. We
may be able to accept theoretical vulnerability to control if computational
difficulty would make it essentially impossible for any computationally
limited attacker.
Since the initial work of Bartholdi et al. a number of voting systems
have been studied with an eye towards computational resistance. Several
systems have been found with a high number of resistances [13] [23] [17],
although some of them are not sufficiently natural for practical use, remain
vulnerable to some of the cases of control, or have other technical flaws.
Thus it is still desirable to search for natural and robust voting systems
with high degrees of control resistance.
Range voting is a voting system with an alternate voter preference rep-
resentation that allows a voter to score their level of approval of each can-
didate [28]. Though primarily lauded for its expressiveness and good be-
havior with several candidates, it also has an increased degree of resis-
tance to control over closely related systems. We will also introduce a
variant of range voting which has the highest degree of resistance to con-
trol among natural voting systems.
The rest of this thesis will provide background on complexity theory
and voting theory and then present original results on the computational
properties of range voting and normalized range voting. Chapter two pro-
vides a brief overview of complexity theory as pertains to this work. Chap-
ter three provides some background on voting theory and computational
social choice, with the systems under study described in sections 3.10 and
3.11. Chapter four contains original results pertaining to these two sys-
tems. A reader with a reasonable background in complexity theory and
computational social choice should be able to manage by reading the sec-
tions on these voting systems and the results, while others may benefit
from reading the previous chapters as well.
Chapter 2
Complexity Theory
One of the key topics in computer science is analyzing the computational
difficulty of various problems.
Though general algorithms may have a wide variety of types of out-
put, in the context of complexity theory, we are concerned primarily with
decision problems, those where the output is just yes or no. Though this
may seem like a severe limitation, it is not much of an issue, as most prob-
lems can easily be phrased in this way. For example, instead of computing
the size of the largest clique in a graph, we can ask if there is a clique of
size ≥ k. Given an algorithm for that problem, the actual size could be
extracted through binary search in a reasonable number of steps.
Modern computers are too complicated for mathematical analysis and
so the model of choice is the Turing machine, an abstract machine consist-
ing of a rewritable tape for input and memory and a finite set of defined
transitions. Though Turing machines are generally more difficult to pro-
gram compared to our modern computers, the model is simpler and easier
to define formally our notions of algorithms, running time, and other key
concepts with.
Furthermore, it is equivalent in power to any other reasonable com-
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putational model, including modern computers and programming lan-
guages. So while the important theorems and classes are formally defined
in terms of Turing machines, much work can be done more informally
with the use of a more a familiar computational model.
Problems are organized into complexity classes, which define their re-
quirements of computation and performance characteristics. One of the
simplest and most important is the class P, which contains all problems
which are computable in polynomial time, orwhere the runtime is bounded
by some polynomial on the size of the input. An algorithmwould not nor-
mally be considered to be very fast if it runs in time O(n100), but in prac-
tice most problems with polynomial-time algorithms are not especially
high in degree, and so we frequently use this as a convenient analogue
for tractability.
Also, if a problem has a polynomial-time algorithm for any reasonable
Turing-equivalent computer model, there will be a polynomial algorithm
for all Turing-equivalent models. This conveniently allows us to work in
the more familiar territory of modern computers while achieving results
that apply across all types of computers, including Turing machines. This
also solidifies the usefulness of P for this analysis, as membership in P is
independent of the messy details of the computation.
The class NP consists of problems that are computable on a non-deterministic
Turing machine (NTM) in polynomial time. This model is equivalent to a
Turing machine that is allowed to guess what path to take whenever it
reaches a branch, or one that can simultaneously run a number of paths
at the same time. For instance, an NTM for the max clique problem could
guess for each vertex whether to try to include that vertex in the clique it
is searching for. An algorithm on an NTM can be naively simulated on
a deterministic TM with an exponential slowdown. However, that is not
necessarily the best that can be done.
One can show a upper bound on the complexity of a problem by sim-
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ply providing an algorithm for it. Providing an lower bound is some-
what more difficult. Just because no one has yet successfully designed a
polynomial-time algorithm for a problem does not mean it does not exist.
However the technique of problem reductions is useful for this purpose.
Formally, a problem L is many-one polynomial-time reducible to M
(written L ≤pm M ) if there is a polynomial-time function f such that for
every instance x of L, x is a yes-instance for L if and only if f(x) is a yes
instance for M . We can then use M to solve L with only a polynomial
amount of additional work for the bookkeeping. Consequently, L can be
no harder than M . Also, it shows that we can embed L inside of M , and
so M is at least as hard as L. It will be helpful to define a few more classes.
Definition 1. A language L is NP-hard if for every L′ ∈NP, L′ ≤pm L
Definition 2. A language L is NP-complete if it is NP-hard and additionally it
is in NP
The NP-complete problems are thus in a sense the hardest problems
in NP, and that seems like a good goal if we want to prove a problem’s
difficulty. Showing that a problem is in NP is usually easy, but showing
that each problem in an infinite class can be reduced to one sounds a bit
imposing. Fortunately, most of the work has been done for us. The Cook-
Levin theorem, independently discovered by Stephen Cook and Leonid
Levin, showed that the boolean satisfiability problem is NP-complete, and
so such a problem does actually exist [9]. From this point, rather than
show that every possible problem inNP can reduce to our problem, we can
just reduce from one of the thousands of known NP-complete problems, a
much more reasonable process.
Now, of course, since membership in P is our de facto measure of
tractability, we want to know whether the problems in NP-complete are
actually distinct from P. NP-complete is distinct from P unless the entirely
of NP collapses down to P. It remains one of themost important open prob-
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lems in computer science whether P=NP. An enormous amount of results
are contingent on the way this lies.
For instance, the problem of factoring integers lies in NP and thus
would have a polynomial time algorithm if P=NP. This problem is at the
foundation of the RSA algorithm, a public key cryptosystems that is essen-
tial for secure communication and commerce on the internet. If P=NP, this
algorithm would be effectively broken, and any archived encrypted com-
munications could potentially be cracked. Every time someone sends their
credit card information over the internet, they are depending on P not be-
ing equal to NP, whether they know it or not. If P=NP countless problems
of practical significance such as image recognition, language processing,
and industrial optimization would suddenly be much easier. Other scien-
tific disciplines would be affected as well, as fundamental problems in eco-
nomics, biology, physics, and mathematics are known to be NP-complete
[19].
Most computer scientists suspect that P6=NP though it continues to
elude proof [25]. Such is the import of the problem that it is included
as one of the Millennium Prize problems by the Clay Mathematics Insti-
tute, putting a million dollar bounty on a proof either way. Still, while the
problem remains open, membership in NP-complete is considered to be
very strong evidence for the intractably of a problem, and it is at least an
indication that a fast, exact algorithm will not soon be forthcoming.
Chapter 3
Voting Theory
3.1 Elections and Voter Representation
The standard model of an election is as a tuple E = (C, V ) where C is the
set of candidates and V is the set of voters, each identified by their pref-
erences. The voters preferences are traditionally represented as a strict or-
dering of the candidates frommost preferred to least preferred. This is the
primarymodel dating back to thework of Arrow [1]. Thismodel forces the
voter’s preferences to be rational, that is, they are transitive and acyclic.
Occasionally irrational voter preferences are considered, where voters ex-
press preferences as a potentially cyclic relation over C [17]. Other than
any sort of ranked ballot the most common voter model is a 0, 1 vector
over the candidates denoting approval or disapproval, most prominently
used by approval voting.
3.2 Condorcet’s Criterion
The Marquis de Condorcet developed a voting system in 18th century
France based around the concept of pairwise comparisons of the candi-
7
CHAPTER 3. VOTING THEORY 8
dates. The idea is that the winner should be a candidate that is pairwise
preferred to every other candidate in the election, with such a candidate
known as the Condorcet winner. However, such a candidate will not al-
ways exists. Even when voter’s preference relations are guaranteed to be
rational, the combined societal preferences may be irrational and contain
cycles. This is known as the “Condorcet paradox.” Still, some voting sys-
tems are designed to select as the winner the Condorcet winner if it exists,
and are described as “Condorcet methods” or “Condorcet compatible.”
For instance, consider the following election among candidates a, b,
and c, and with the voters shown below.
# Voters Preferences
1 a > b > c
1 b > c > a
1 c > a > b
Two out of three prefer a to b, b to c, and c to a. Thus there is a cycle in
the aggregate preference relation and this election admits no clear winner.
3.3 Arrow’s Theorem
Arrow’s theorem implies that all election systems are flawed in some way.
His election model requires voter preferences be provided as strict order-
ings and a voting system must generate an aggregate preference ordering
of the candidates rather than just a single winner. Given an election with
at least three candidates and following this model, no voting system can
satisfy all of the following:
Nondictatorship No one voter always decides the election.
Citizen sovereignty All aggregate preferences are possible.
Monotonicity If a voter increases their ranking of a candidate, that candi-
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date does not do any worse.
Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) Aggregate preferences be-
tween two candidates should only depend on the relative prefer-
ences between those two candidates. Changes to the candidate set
or changes to the rankings of other candidates should not change
the result of an election.
The first three criteria are reasonably straightforward but the fourth
deserves a bit more explanation. IIA captures that a preference for one al-
ternative over another should depend on any other alternatives. Yet many
voting systems violate this. For example, plurality does not satisfy IIA.
Consider the following election with C = {a, b, c} and V as follows.
# Voters Preferences
5 a > b > c
4 b > a > c
2 c > b > a
Here, plurality will rank the candidates a > b > c and thus a will be the
winner. Consider, however, what happens if c, the third place candidate,
drops out. The voters will now be as follows.
# Voters Preferences
5 a > b
6 b > a
The aggregate preferences flip and b changes to become the winner of
the election, an arguably undesirable result.
Even the more obvious criteria can fail in otherwise reasonable voting
systems. For instance, the system single transferable vote fails monotonic-
ity [11]. The system is defined as follows. Voters vote by specifying their
entire list of preferences from first to last. If any candidate receives the
most first place votes, they are the winner of the election. If there is no ma-
jority winner, the candidate with the fewest first place votes is eliminated
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and the process repeats. This system is used in political elections around
the world. Its use is advocated in the United States by the organization
FairVote under the name “instant runoff voting” [14].
Consider the following example election over the candidates {a, b, c}
# Voters Preferences
6 a > b > c
5 b > a > c
4 c > b > a
2 c > a > b
Initially, b is the first candidate eliminated. The votes of the second
class of voter shift to a and a wins the election. However, consider if the
fourth class of voters all change their votes to rank a first and the following
election occurs instead:
# Voters Preferences
6 a > b > c
5 b > a > c
4 c > b > a
2 a > c > b
Now, c will be eliminated in the first round. The votes of the third
class of voters will shift to b and b will win the election. By raising their




The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [22] [27] and later the more general
Duggan-Schwartz theorem [12] show that any reasonable voting system is
vulnerable to strategic voting. Barring dictatorships and voting systems
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with certain uses of randomness, there will always be cases where a voter
will receive a more beneficial result by distorting their true preferences.
Consider the following election over candidates {a, b, c}, using the plu-
rality voting system.
# Voters Preferences
5 a > b > c
4 b > c > a
2 c > b > a
Initially, a will be the winner. However, note that if the two voters of
the third type instead vote as b > c > a, b will instead be the winner, a
better result according to their true preferences.
3.5 Voting Systems
Whatever the preference representation, a voting system aggregates the
voter preferences to determine a winner. Note that the preference repre-
sentation includes much more information than many real-world ballots.
However voting systems are not required to use all of the information on
the ballot.
3.5.1 Scoring Protocols
A large class of voting systems qualify as scoring protocols. A scoring proto-
col is a vector (α1, α2, . . . , αm) of natural numbers in non-increasing order,
where each number denotes the amount of points awarded to the can-
didate placing at that position on a particular ballot. The final ranking
and winner are determined by summing up the points awarded by every
ballot. For instance, consider the scoring protocol (3, 1, 0) applied to the
follow election:
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# Voters Preferences
3 a > b > c
2 b > c > a
1 c > b > a
a receives 3 ∗ 3 points from the first type of voters and none from the
rest for 9 total. b receives 2 ∗ 3 points from the first class, 3 ∗ 2 from the
second, and 2 ∗ 1 from the third for 14 total. c receives none from the first
voters, but then 2 ∗ 2 from the second and 3 ∗ 1 from the third for 7 points
total. Thus the final preference ordering is b > a > c.
As a scoring protocol is a fixed-length vector, families of scoring proto-
cols exists, which are sets of scoring protocols which use the same scoring
technique over all sizes of elections. Many common voting systems can be
represented as families of scoring protocols.
Plurality
Plurality is the most familiar real world election system. It can be repre-
sented as a family of scoring protocols as (1, 0, . . . , 0).
Veto
Veto is in a sense the inverse of plurality, where each voter must reject
exactly one candidate. As a family of scoring protocols it is (1, 1, . . . , 1, 0).
k-Approval
k-approval is a family of systemswhere votersmust select and approve ex-
actly k candidates. As a family of scoring protocols this is (1, . . . , 1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
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Borda
Borda count awards points in steadily decreasing order from the most pre-
ferred down. It can be represented as (m− 1,m− 2, . . . , 1, 0) as a family of
scoring protocols.
3.5.2 Condorcet Compatible
Another class of voting systems follow Condorcet’s ideas by basing the
election on pairwise comparisons of the candidates and meeting the Con-
dorcet criteria.
Dodgson Dodgson elections were introduced by Charles Dodgson, bet-
ter known by his pen name Lewis Carrol.
The winner of the election is the candidate with the lowest Dodgson
score, where the Dodgson score is the number of swaps of adjacent candi-
dates in a voter’s preferences are required to make a candidate the Con-
dorcet winner. Naturally, if there is a Condorcet winner, this candidate
requires zero swaps and so they will win the election.
Consider the following election among candidates {a, b, c, d, e, f}.
# Voters Preferences
10 a > d > b > e > c > f
10 c > a > e > b > d > f
10 b > f > c > a > d > e
This election has no Condorcet winner as a, b, and c form a cycle with a
preferred to b, b preferred to c, and c preferred to a. However, we canmake
a the Condorcet winner by making just one preference swap, resulting in,
for instance, the following election.
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# Voters Preferences
10 a > d > b > e > c > f
9 c > a > e > b > d > f
1 a > c > e > b > d > f
10 b > f > c > a > d > e
The other two near-Condorcet candidateswill require at least two swaps
to become Condorcet winners, as the candidates d, e, f , though they are
not close to winning the election, are in the way of the candidates they
need to supersede.
Though this seems to be a reasonable voting system, it is actually NP-
hard to calculate the Dodgson score of a candidate, severely limiting its
practicality [2]. Approximation algorithms have been developed for find-
ing the [8], though this does not lead to the kind of confidence we usually
seek in a voting system.
Llull-Copeland Llull-Copeland voting is a Condorcet-compatible vot-
ing system with polynomial-time winner determination. The system was
described by Copeland in 1951 [10], though it was recently discovered to
have been first described by the 13th century mystic Ramon Llull [17] who
proposed it as a method for electing figures in the church.
The system works by selecting the candidate that has the most pair-
wise victories over other candidates. Variations on the system are possible
by changing how many points are awarded for a tie. Clearly, this is a
Condorcet-compatible system, as a Condorcet winner will have the maxi-
mum number of pairwise victories possible.
3.6 Control
Control represents the efforts of a centralized authority, the chair of an
election to alter the structure of the election in order to affect its outcome.
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This involves changing either the candidate or voter sets or partitioning
either into subelections. In real world political elections, this corresponds
to voter fraud and voter suppression, back-room dealings with potential
candidates, and gerrymandering and similar manipulations. In the con-
text of multiagent systems, it is related to any efforts by a system designer
or administrator to alter the results by changing the parameters of the sys-
tem.
More formally, for the purposes of the complexity theoretic analysis of
the control problems, we will analyze the cases of control in the form of
decision problems. That is, we will define a problem where the goal is to
find whether in a particular election a certain case of control can succeed
in its goals.
The goal is to classify a voting system as vulnerable, resistant, or im-
mune to each of the various cases of control, with these terms initially
defined by Bartholdi et al. [3] and widely adopted since. It is helpful now
to define these notions precisely.
Vulnerability A voting system is vulnerable to a case of control if that
action has potential to affect the result of an election, and the associated
decision problem can be solved in polynomial time; that is, it is in P. This
has a very good practical correspondence with real world efficiency of the
problem, and thus the case of control is computationally easy.
Resistance A voting system is resistant to a case of control if that action
has potential to affect the result of an election, and the associated deci-
sion problem is NP-hard. The idea of NP-hardness has a long and storied
history, but for the current purposes, it suffices to say that such problems
are very unlikely to have efficient solutions, barring a major shift in our
understanding of computer science.
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Immunity A voting system is immune to a case of control if that action
cannot affect the result of the election. This is obviously a desirable notion
but it is generally harder to come by, and many immunities are incompat-
ible with very basic and reasonable properties of voting systems [13].
The control cases of Bartholdi et al. were all constructive, that is, the
control is directed towards making a distinguished candidate the win-
ner. In some cases, a malicious chair could conceivably want above all
to prevent a particular candidate from winning the election, regardless of
who else wins. This idea was introduced by Conitzer et al. as destructive
manipulation and later by Hemaspaandra et al. in the context of control
[24]. Though this may seem to be a less desirable goal, it may be feasible
in some cases where constructive control is not and thus is it also worth
studying.
Among the cases of control are control by adding or deleting either vot-
ers or candidates. In the case of adding voters or candidates, the new par-
ticipants must be chosen from a set rather than arbitrarily created. While
this type of control is not necessarily thus limited, the decision problems
are defined as having a limit on the number of voters or candidates that
can be added or deleted. In the candidate cases, the distinguished candi-
date must be in the original candidate set. In the cases of destructive con-
trol by deleting candidates, the distinguished candidate cannot be among
those deleted as that would trivially solve the problem.
The various cases of control by partition are not quite straightforward
and deserve a little explanation. In any control by partition problem, initial
subelections are performed with segments of the voter and candidate sets
and a final election is performed with the candidates that survive these
subelections.
In control by partition of voters, the voter set is partitioned into two
subsets and an subelections are run with each (with the original candidate
set). The candidates that survive each subelection face off to find the final
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winner of the election.
Control by partition of candidates has two major variants. In one vari-
ant, control by partition, one set of candidates is separated off from the rest
for an initial subelection. Whatever candidates survive this election then
rejoin the rest of the candidates for the final election with the entire voter
set. In the other variant, control by run-off partition, the candidate set is
partitioned into two sets and each set conducts an initial subelection. The
candidates that survive each of these elections then are brought together
for the final election with the entire voter set.
There is an additional variation in the tiebreaking rule that is chosen in
the subelections. In the case of a tie, either all of the top scoring candidates
are promoted to the final election, or none of them are. These two cases
are called ties-promote and ties-eliminate. Notably, in the second case, an
election can fail to elect any candidate. Though these may seem like subtle
differences, many voting systems will resist one of the cases while being
vulnerable to another. It is probably sufficient to skim this section and read
a few definitions to get the flavor, and refer to it later to clarify a specific
definition.
Control by Adding Candidates
Given An election E = (C, V ), a distinguished candidate w ∈ C, a spoiler
candidate set D, and k ∈ N
Question (Constructive Is it possible to make w the winner of an election
(C ∪D′, V ) with some D′ ⊆ D where |D′| ≤ k?
Question (Destructive) Is it possible to make w not the winner of an elec-
tion (C ∪D′, V ) with some D′ ⊆ D where |D′| ≤ k?
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Control by Deleting Candidates
Given An election E = (C, V ), a distinguished candidate w ∈ C, and
k ∈ N
Question (Constructive) Is it possible to make w the winner of an election
(C − C ′, V ) with some C ′ ⊆ C where |C ′| ≥ k?
Question (Destructive) Is it possible to make w not the winner of an elec-
tion (C − C ′, V ) with some C ′ ⊆ (C − {w}) where |C ′| ≤ k?
Control by Adding Voters
Given An election E = (C, V ), a distinguished candidates w ∈ C, an
additional voter set U , and k ∈ N
Question (Constructive) Is it possible to make w the winner of an election
(C, V ∪ U ′) for some U ′ ⊆ U where |U ′| ≤ k?
Question (Destructive) Is it possible to make w not the winner of an elec-
tion (C, V ∪ U ′) for some U ′ ⊆ U where |U ′| ≤ k?
Control by Deleting Voters
Given An election E = (C, V ), a distinguished candidates w ∈ C, and
k ∈ N
Question (Constructive) Is it possible to make w the winner of an election
(C, V − V ′) for some V ′ ⊆ V where |V ′| ≤ k?
Question (Destructive) Is it possible to make w not the winner of an elec-
tion (C, V − V ′) for some V ′ ⊆ V where |V ′| ≤ k?
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Control by Partition of Candidates
Given An election E = (C, V ) and a distinguished candidates w ∈ C
Question (Constructive) Is there a partition C1, C2 of C such that w is the
final winner of the election (D ∪ C2, V ), where D is the set of candi-
dates surviving the initial subelection (C1, V )?
Question (Destructive) Is there a partition C1, C2 of C such that w is not
the final winner of the election (D ∪ C2, V ), where D is the set of
candidates surviving the subelection (C1, V )?
Control by Runoff Partition of Candidates
Given An election E = (C, V ) and a distinguished candidates w ∈ C
Question (Constructive) Is there a partition C1, C2 of C such that w is the
final winner of the election (D1∪D2, V ), whereD1 andD2 are the sets
of surviving candidates from the subelections (C1, V ) and (C2, V )?
Question (Destructive) Is there a partition C1, C2 of C such that w is the
final winner of the election (D1∪D2, V ), whereD1 andD2 are the sets
of surviving candidates from the subelections (C1, V ) and (C2, V )?
Control by Partition of Voters
Given An election E = (C, V ) and a distinguished candidates w ∈ C
Question (Constructive) Is there a partition V1, V2 of V such that w is the
final winner of the election (D1∪D2, V ) where D1 and D2 are the sets
of surviving candidates from the subelections (C, V1) and (C, V2)?
Question (Destructive) Is there a partition V1, V2 of V such that w is not
the final winner of the election (D1 ∪ D2, V ) where D1 and D2 are
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the sets of surviving candidates from the subelections (C, V1) and
(C, V2)?
3.7 Caveats
It is important to note that NP-hardness is a worst case notion and an NP-
hard problem could still be easy in many cases, or it could be easy to find
a good approximation. Recent research has shown that many NP-hard
control problems are easy when voter’s preferences are arranged in the
common single-peaked model [18]. Work by Friedgut et al. has shown
that random manipulations of the voters in an election are reasonably
likely to be effective in any reasonable election system [20]. Other research
has studied the application of approximation algorithms to manipulative
problems in voting systems, which can potentially find a solution within a
fixed bound of the ideal solution, even if the ideal solution is out of reach
[15] [7]. Therefore this work is a good first step in providing confidence in
the integrity of range voting, but it is not the final word.
3.8 Other Voting Systems and Control
Most natural systems have at least a few gaps with regard to control re-
sistance. Several systems have been designed and considered specifically
for their high number of resistances. Hemaspaandra et al. developed a hy-
brid election system that is resistant to all standard types of control [23].
Though the construction is highly unnatural, it resolved the open problem
of whether it is possible for a election system to possess all of the resis-
tances.
Copeland voting is a Condorcet-compatible voting system that ranks
candidates based on their number of victories in head to head contests
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among the other candidates. Faliszewski et al. found Copeland voting to
be resistant to every case of constructive control and to have a good num-
ber of resistances to destructive control [17]. This was also a useful result,
as it established that natural voting systems could hold at least every con-
structive resistance. See table 3.1 for their results.
The system sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting, intro-
duced by Brams and Sanver [6] and adapted to deal with control by Erdélyi
et al. [13], has been shown to have a large number of resistances, and it is
a fairly natural system. Brams and Sanver originally introduced SP-AV to
discuss outcomes under various possible voter strategies and to integrate
approval style ballots with the classical ranked order voter preferences [6].
Their system represents the voter’s preferences as a ranked ordering of the
candidates along with an approval threshold, where a voter approves of
every candidate ranked at least as high as that threshold. In addition, there
is the restriction that each voter must both approve of and reject at least
one candidate with any other ballot considered inadmissible. This creates
problems when dealing with candidate control, as a voter’s ballot can be
transformed from admissible to inadmissible if their only approved candi-
date is deleted, for instance. Erdélyi et al. suggested to add an additional
step of vote coercion to the system. If a voter supplies an inadmissible
vote, either accepting or rejecting all the candidates, their approval thresh-
old is shifted by one candidate in the appropriate direction. This allows
every voter to have an admissible vote in the end, and it also gives the
system interesting properties with regard to control. The system in effect
captures the resistance of both approval voting and plurality. The results
are listed in table 3.2. However, Baumeister et al. took issue with the sys-
tem as presented [4]. The vote coercion step is not properly a part of Brams
and Sanver’s original system. Also, the rule makes an arbitrary decision
about where to set the new threshold when coercing a vote. Baumeister et
al. propose a subtly different system that more explicitly includes the co-
ercion step. The system remains somewhat unsatisfying, as its very effect
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is to force a distinction between candidates that a voter may have honestly
ranked the same. Therefore it is still desirable to continue the search for a
natural system with a similar or better level of resistance.
Table 3.1: Control Results for Plurality and Copeland [17]
Control by Tie Model Plurality Copeland
C D C D
Adding candidates R R R V
Deleting candidates R R R V
Partition of Candidates TE R R R V
TP R R R V
Run-off Partition of Candidates TE R R R V
R R R V
Adding Voters V V R R
Deleting Voters V V R R
Partition of Voters TE V V R R
TP R R R R
3.9 Manipulation and Bribery
Manipulation and bribery are the other classes of manipulative actions
that are studied in the context of computational social choice. The manip-
ulation problem studies attempts of a voter coalition to alter the outcome
of an election by strategically coordinating their votes. As with control
problems we can define constructive and destructive versions of this prob-
lem.
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Table 3.2: Control Results for Approval and Sincere-Strategy Preference-
Based Approval Voting (SP-AV) [13]
Control by Tie Model Approval SP-AV
C D C D
Adding candidates I V R R
Deleting candidates V I R R
Partition of Candidates TE V I R R
TP I I R R
Run-off Partition of Candidates TE V I R R
TP I I R R
Adding Voters R V R V
Deleting Voters R V R V
Partition of Voters TE R V R V
TP R V R R
Manipulation
Given An election E = (C, V ), a distinguished candidate w ∈ C, and an
additional collection ofmanipulators V ′ with votes as yet unassigned
Question (Constructive) Is it possible assign the votes of V ′ in a way to
make w the winner of the election (C, V ∪ V ′)?
Question (Destructive) Is it possible assign the votes of V ′ in a way to
make w not the winner of the election (C, V ∪ V ′)?
Note that this differs slightly from the traditional social choice defini-
tion as in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, which instead is concerned
with voters who already have preferences changing their vote as to get a
better outcome by these preferences. For the rest of this thesis, “manipula-
tion” will refer to the computational social choice definition given above.
The bribery problem is concerned with an outside manipulator with
limited resources attempting to change the outcome of an election by buy-
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ing the votes of some limited set of voters.
Bribery
Given An election E = (C, V ), a distinguished candidate w ∈ C, and
k ∈ N
Question (Constructive) Is it possible to make w the winner of the elec-
tion by changing the votes of up to k voters?
Question (Destructive) Is it possible to make w not the winner of the elec-
tion by changing the votes of up to k voters?
Manipulation is easy in many voting systems while bribery is more
frequently difficult. Bribery is usually at least as hard as manipulation for
a given voting system. We can think of the bribery problem of first finding
an ideal set of voters to alter, and then running the manipulation problem
on them to assign their votes. However this is not always the case, and
unnatural voting systems do exist where the bribery problem is easy (∈ P)
and the manipulation problem is hard (NP-hard) [16].
3.10 Range Voting
Range voting (RV) is a voting system with an alternate voter representa-
tion that allows voters to express their degree of approval in each candi-
date. We will describe a k-range election as E = (C, V ) where C is the set
of candidates with |C| = m, and V is the set of voters with |V | = n and for
a voter v ∈ V , v ∈ (0, 1, . . . , k)m. Each voter expresses their preferences by
giving a score for each candidate. The parameter k sets the highest score
a voter is allowed to give a candidate. The winner of the election is the
candidate with the highest cumulative score among all voters.
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Example The following is an example of a 2-range election of the candi-
dates {a, b, c}. a will be the winner with a total of 14 points.
# Voters a b c
5 2 0 1
6 0 2 0
4 1 2 0
Though range voting is sometimes described allowing scores over a
real interval such as [0, 1] [28], this paper will deal with the more limited
integral version for its practicality of implementation and to avoid issues
with the size of representation. Our primary concern is to study the dif-
ficulty of decision problems relating to the system and allowing scores of
unbounded size would greatly complicate that analysis. Note that any
bounded size and precision real number representation would be equiva-
lent to an integral representation, so this version will be just as expressive
as a rational representation or any other which would be suitable for com-
putational analysis.
Arrow’s theorem was formulated with the traditional voter preference
models of a strict ordering. Since range voting uses a different model, it is
not bound by that result and, though subject to interpretation, achieves all
of the normally impossible criteria [28] [26].
To demonstrate, let us revisit the earlier example that showed violation
of IIA, which is typically the hardest criteria to achieve. Let us formulate
this as a 1-range election, and assume that each voter only gives any points
to their top candidate.
# Voters a b c
5 1 0 0
4 0 1 0
2 0 0 1
Again, a wins this initial election. Now, if we remove the last place
candidate c:
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The c voters are left not awarding any points to anybody, which is a
perfectly legal vote, and perfectly rational, if one does feel no distinction
between the candidates. Consequently the original result stands and a
remains the winner.
3.10.1 Other Similar Voting Systems
Approval Voting Approval voting is a voting system where voter pref-
erences are represented by approving or disapproving of each candidate
individually [5].
Range voting can be seen as a straightforward extension of approval
voting where voter’s preferences are cast over a {0, . . . , k} vector rather
than a {0, 1} vector. Consequently we can express an approval election as
a 1-range election. This is quite useful for the purpose of analyzing the
computational properties of range voting and finding problems to which
it is resistant. Since approval is just a special case of range voting, any
problem relating to approval which is NP-hard will automatically be NP-
hard for range voting as well.
Utility Based Voting The model utility based voting allows voters to al-
locate some (generally limited) number of points among the candidates
according to their preferences [15]. Utility is a term from economics that
quantifies the value that one receives from a given outcome. These sys-
tems allow voters to express their personal utility for each of the candi-
dates and use that information to select the winner. Parameters to the
system are the total number of points a voter can allocate and the maxi-
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mum number of points that can be allocated to a given candidate. Also, in
a free-form election, voters are not required to allocate all their points. This
model is flexible enough to describe such systems as plurality, approval,
n-approval, and also range voting. A k-range election with m candidates
is equivalent to a free-form utility based election allowing up to k points
per candidate and mk points total for each voter.
UtilitarianVoting Range voting is part of a class of voting systems termed
utilitarian voting by Hillinger [26]. This encompasses any system that al-
lows the voters to independently score each candidate according to their
personal utility derived from that candidate winning. This includes ap-
proval, range voting, and evaluative voting, which allows voters to score
candidates as −1, 0, or 1. Such systems have the potential to satisfy condi-
tions, such as the conditions of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, which are
out of reach for any voting system with the traditional ordered ballot [26].
3.11 Normalized Range Voting
A rational voter seeking to maximize their impact in an election would al-
ways give their most preferred candidate the highest score possible (k) and
their least preferred candidate the lowest score possible (0). The system
Normalized Range Voting (NRV) captures this and also gives the system
more interesting behavior under several types of centralized control.
In this system each voter specifies their preferences as in standard range
voting. However, as part of the score aggregation, the system normalizes
each vote to the rational range [0, k]. Formally, for a voter v and their max-
imum and minimum scores a and b, their each score s for a candidate is
changed to k(s−b)
a−b
. If a = b, a voter shows no preference among the can-
didates and this vote will not be counted. The system does not make an
effort to coerce such an unconcerned vote into one that distinguishes be-
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tween the candidates.
The relationship between RV and NRV is closely analogous to the re-
lationship between approval voting and SP-AV. The normalization step
ends up removing several cases of control immunity, but it introduces
more complex behavior on alterations of the candidate set that gain back
a greater number of control resistances.
Unlike RV, NRV unambiguously fails the criteria independence of ir-
relevant alternatives. Consider a 2-NRV election with C = {a, b, c} and V
below.
# Voters a b c
7 2 0 0
4 0 2 0
4 0 1 2
a will win this election with a score of 14, with 12 and 8 for their rivals
b and c. However, consider the election with the same voters but with the
candidate c removed.




At first, a appears to still be winning the election. However the nor-
malization step will scale up the votes from the third group of voters to
give b 16 points in total, making b the winner of the election.
While this seems to be a negative against this system, this complex,
shifting behavior on the changing of the candidates is exactly what allows
us to achieve a large number of control resistances for NRV over RV.
Chapter 4
Results
This chapter will consist of technical proofs of immunity/susceptibility
as well as proofs of complexity using the standard technique of many-one
problem reductions. The idea is to show that we can convert an instance of
a known difficult problem into an instance of the problem under study and
thus our new problem is at least as hard as one known to be difficult. Table
4.1 summaries these results as well as comparing them to the resistances
possessed by approval voting and SP-AV. The results for RV and NRV are
original to this thesis.
4.1 Immunity and Susceptibility
Before analyzing resistance, it is necessary to examine whether it is in fact
possible to alter an election through that type of control, that is, whether
the voting system is susceptible or immune to that case of control.
Several of the control cases are linked in terms in susceptibility, as one
may be the inverse of the other, or just a slightly more elaborate version.
This simplifies the matter of achieving the full set of results as fewer cases
actually have to be proved. Furthermore several susceptibility results fol-
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Table 4.1: Control Results for Approval, Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based
Approval Voting, Range Voting, Normalized Range Voting [13]
Control by Tie Model Approval SPAV RV NRV
C D C D C D C D
Adding candidates I V R R I V R R
Deleting candidates V I R R V I R R
Partition of Candidates TE V I R R V I R R
TP I I R R I I R R
Run-off Partition of Candidates TE V I R R V I R R
TP I I R R I I R R
Adding Voters R V R V R V R V
Deleting Voters R V R V R V R V
Partition of Voters TE R V R V R V R ?
TP R V R R R V R R
low from simple properties of the voting system.
One simple property, the unique version of the Weak Axiom of Re-
vealed Preference (or Unique-WARP) implies several control immunities.
Definition 3. In a voting system satisfying Unique-WARP, a unique winner
among a collection of candidates will remain the winner among any subcollection
of which they are a part [3].
Any voting system obeying this property will be immune to construc-
tive control by adding candidates, destructive control by deleting candi-
dates, and destructive control by partition or runoff partition of candidates
in both tie handling models [24]
Theorem 4.1.1. RV is immune to constructive control by adding candidates,
destructive control by deleting candidates, and destructive control by partition or
runoff partition of candidates.
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Proof RV can easily be seen to satisfy Unique-WARP. The unique winner
among a collection of candidates has the highest sum score among all the
voters. In any subcollection they will still have the highest score and they
will still be the winner. Thus RV achieves the immunities. 
Theorem 4.1.2. RV is immune to constructive control by partition and runoff
partition in the ties-promote model.
Proof In RV, any candidate that is in first place (possibly tied) will be in
first in any subset of the candidates of which they are a part. Therefore
they will survive any initial subelection in the ties-promote model. Con-
sequently no candidate that is not already the unique winner can be made
to be the unique winner through partition of candidates in this model. 
Hemaspaandra et al. [24] defined the notion of a voiced voting system,
where an election with exactly one candidate will result in that candidate
as the winner. For every voiced voting system, the following is true: it
is susceptible to constructive control by deleting candidates, destructive
control by adding candidates, and if it is susceptible to destructive control
by partition of voters, it is susceptible to destructive control by deleting
voters.
Theorem 4.1.3. RV and NRV are susceptible to constructive control by deleting
candidates, destructive control by adding candidates, constructive and destruc-
tive control by partition of voters, and destructive control by deleting voters.
Proof Consider the following election over the candidates {a, b, c}, either
a 2-range or 2-normalized-range election:
# Voters a b c
2 2 0 0
4 1 2 0
3 1 0 2
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The initial winner of this election is a. However, we can affect this
election through partition of voters to make b the winner, as follows.
# Voters a b c
1 2 0 0
4 1 2 0
# Voters a b c
1 2 0 0
3 1 0 2
b wins the first subelection and c wins the second, with b coming ahead
in the final election between the two. We have both prevented a from
winning the election and made b the winner of the election. Thus RV and
NRV are susceptible to constructive and destructive control by partition of
voters in either tie handling model. This, plus the fact that both of these
systems are voiced, imply the other cases. 
Notably, NRV does not satisfy Unique-WARP and does not posses the
immunities that RV does. We can show it is in fact susceptible to these
cases of control.
Theorem 4.1.4. NRV is susceptible to destructive control by deleting candidates
and constructive control by adding candidates.
Proof Consider the follow 2-normalized-range election over candidates
{a, b, c}.
# Voters a b c
7 2 0 0
4 0 2 0
4 0 1 2
The winner of the original election will be a. However, with candidate
c deleted, the votes of the third class of voters will be normalized to al-
lot 2 points to candidate b, and b will become the winner of the election.
Therefore NRV is susceptible to destructive control by deleting candidates.
Susceptibility to the other case follows from this [24]. 
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Theorem 4.1.5. RV and NRV are susceptible constructive and destructive con-
trol by adding and deleting voters.
Proof Consider the following election over {a, b} (interpreted as either a
1-range or 1-normalized-range election).
# Voters a b
5 1 0
4 0 1
By deleting two or more of the first class of voter we will make a no
longer the winner (destructive control by deleting voters) as well as mak-
ing b the newwinner (constructive control by deleting voters). These cases
imply the other two. .
Theorem 4.1.6. RV is susceptible to constructive control by partition and runoff
partition of candidates in the ties-eliminate model.
Consider the following 1-range election over {a, b, c}.
# Voters a b c
1 1 0 0
2 0 1 0
2 0 0 1
Initially, this election has no unique winner, though candidates b and c
are tied for first. However, by partitioning the candidate set into {a}, {b, c},
the outcome is different. b and c will tie in their subelection and be elim-
inated. If this action is interpreted as control by runoff partition, a will
win their single candidate election. In either case, a is the sole remaining
candidate and becomes the winner of the election. 
Theorem 4.1.7. NRV is susceptible to constructive and destructive control by
partition and runoff partition of candidates in both tie handling models.
Consider the following 2-normalized-range election over candidates
{a, b, c}.
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# Voters a b c
7 2 0 0
4 0 2 0
4 0 1 2
The initial winner of this election is a. Partitioning the candidates into
{a}, {b, c} will change the outcome of the election. If this action is inter-
preted as runoff partition a will win their initial subelection, or otherwise
{a} is the remaining set of candidates. b will win their subelection and go
on to win the final election over a after the scores are normalized. No ties
occur so this will work in either tie handling model. We both prevent a
from becoming the winner and cause b to become the winner, so NRV is
susceptible to both constructive and destructive control by partition and
runoff partition of candidates in both tie handling models.
4.2 Vulnerability Results
The majority of the problems to which RV and NRV are vulnerable have
trivial algorithms which are only slight variations of those used for ap-
proval voting, which can be seen in the work of Hemaspaandra et al [24].
The following problems are sufficiently different and interesting to merit
detailed inclusion.
4.2.1 Destructive Control by Partition of Voters
Theorem 4.2.1. k-RV is vulnerable to destructive control by partition of voters
in either tie handling model, for any fixed k.
A dynamic programming algorithm, a variation of one used to solve
PARTITION in pseudo-polynomial time [21] can be used to solve this
problem. The idea of the algorithm is that if the distinguished candidate w
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is the original winner, a partition must cause w to lose to one candidate in
the first partition and another candidate in the second to make them lose
the election. The algorithm loops over pairs of candidates and checks if a
successful partition exists for that pair of candidates.
Given an instance (C, V ), w of the control problem with |C| = m and
|V | = n, first perform the initial check if w is the winner, and if not return
true immediately. Then perform the following procedure for every pair of
candidates in C − {w}.
Given w and the two other candidates c1, c2 from C, construct a (2∗m∗
k + 1)× (2 ∗m ∗ k + 1)× (n + 1) three-dimensional array, with the first two
indices ranging from−2∗m∗k to 2∗m∗k and with the third index ranging
from 0 to n. The cell at position (x, y, z) records whether a partition of
voters in V1, V2 can be made using the first z voters (in some fixed order)
such that x is the score of c1 in V1 minus the score of w in V1, and y is
the score of c2 in V2 minus the score of w in V2. The cell (0, 0, 0) will be
marked as reachable and all cells will initially be marked as unreachable.
Reachable cells will also record whether this allocation came from placing
the last voter in V1 or V2, in order to aid in retrieving the actual allocation.
A successful partition of the voters will exist causing w to lose the election
if there is some reachable cell at an index (x, y, n) where x, y > 0 in the
ties-promote model, or x, y ≥ 0 in the ties-eliminate model.
The array can be filled in as follows. Given a reachable cell (x, y, z), fill
in cell (x + d1, y, z + 1) with (T, 1), denoting that that cell is reachable with
voter z + 1 placed in V1, where d1 is the difference of the scores of c1 and w
according to voter z + 1. Fill in cell (x, y + d2, z + 1) with (T, 2), denoting
that that cell is reachable with voter z + 1 placed in V2, where d2 is the
difference of the scores of c2 and w according to voter z + 1. Also, do not
rewrite over the contents of a cell if it has already been marked.
By proceeding in this way all reachable partitions will eventually be
marked and a successful partition, if it exists, can be derived from work-
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ing backwards down the table from the cell at the top level by checking the
contents of the cell and the preferences of the appropriate voter. If a suc-
cessful partition is found for any this of candidates, exit and return true.
Otherwise continue through to the next pair of candidates, eventually re-
turning false if no successful partition is ever found.
This algorithm will run in time O(m4k2n). Since k is a fixed constant
and m and n are polynomial in the size of the input, the algorithm runs in
polynomial time. Therefore RV is vulnerable to these control problems. 
4.3 Resistance Results
4.3.1 Generalization of Resistance Results
The proofs here will refer necessarily to specific RV and NRV elections
with a particular scoring range k. However we want to be able to show
resistance for any arbitrary k.
Theorem 4.3.1. If RV or NRV exhibits resistance to a case of control for a par-
ticular scoring range k, it will exhibit that resistance for any range l ≥ k
We can reduce an instance of a control problem for a k-range election
to a l-range election for any l ≥ k by simply modifying the theoretical
maximum score without changing anything else about the election. Since
the bound does not affect the votes except by setting the maximum score,
this will not change the election or its behavior under control.
The same construction will work for NRV though a bit more explana-
tion is required. We can reduce any control problem for a k-normalized-
range election to a l-normalized-range election for any l ≥ k by sim-
ply changing the maximum score and not changing the voters or candi-
dates. In this case, the election is substantially changed as the increased
bound will affect the normalization step of the scoring process. Note in a
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normalized range election, all votes that rank any candidates differently
are normalized to k(s−b)
a−b
where a and b are the maximum and minimum
scores allotted to a candidate by that particular voter. Thus in our new





. All votes and thus all cumulative candidate scores will in-
crease uniformly and whoever won the original election will win the new
election as well. However, in cases of candidate control, the minimum
and maximum scores for a particular voter can change as well and thus
further affect the election. Consider a vote with the initial minimum and
maximum scores of a and b and with new scores of a′ and b′ after changes
to the candidate set due to control. If a and b and a′ and b′ are both dis-




, a factor of a−b
a′−b′
.





either a and b or a′ and b′ are equal, that vote will be ignored in both the
original k-normalized-range election and the l-normalized-range election.
Therefore the score for any candidate from that voter will go from 0 to 0
and thus will also change at a factor of l
k
. Thus in every case all scores and
also the aggregate scores will change at a ratio of l
k
and so the election will
proceed in the same way.
4.3.2 Results Derived From Approval
Due to RV’s great similarity with approval voting, many results relating
to approval trivially apply to RV and NRV.
Theorem 4.3.2. If approval voting is resistant to a case of control, RV and NRV
will also be resistant for any scoring range.
This is easy to show. We can reduce from an instance of any approval
control problem by simply considering the election a 1-range election or
a 1-normalized-range election. A 1-range election is exactly equivalent so
this will trivially work. For the NRV election, though this does techni-
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cally include the normalization step which can modify the election, when
the score range is 1, no normalization is actually performed, so again this
election is equivalent to the original approval election. These results will
also generalize to k-RV and k-NRV any k ≥ 1 as previously described.
Theorem 4.3.3. 1-RV and 1-NRV are resistant to the following cases of control
for: constructive control by adding voters, constructive control by deleting voters,
and constructive control by the partition of voters in the ties-promote and ties-
eliminate models.
All of these resistances are derived from reductions from approval as
described above, and the fact that approval is resistant to these cases of
control [24]. 
4.3.3 Adding/Deleting Candidates
Theorem 4.3.4. 2-NRV is resistant to constructive and destructive control by
adding or deleting candidates.
This proof is based on a similar proof relating in SP-AV by Erdélyi et
al. [13], which itself was based on proofs relating to plurality by Bartholdi
et al [3] and Hemaspaandra et al. [24].
We will reduce from an instance of the hitting set problem, defined as
follows [21].
Given: A collection S of subsets of a set B, k ∈ Z+
Question: Does B contain a hitting set B′ of size k or less that contains at
least one element from every S ∈ S?
Given a hitting set instance (B, (S), ‖) with |B| = n and |∫ | = m wewill
construct a 2-range election. The candidate set C will consist of B ∪{c, w}.
The voter set V will be as follows:
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• 2m(k + 1) + 4n voters have a score of 2 for c, and a score of 0 for all
other candidates.
• 3m(k + 1) + 2k + 1 voters have a score of 2 for w, and a score of 0 for
all other candidates.
• For each b ∈ B, 4 voters have a score of 2 for b, a score of 1 for w, and
a score of 0 for all other candidates.
• For each Si ∈ S, 2(k +1) voters have a score of 2 for b, for each b ∈ Si,
a score of 1 for c, and a score of 0 for all other candidates.
This will lead to scores in ({c, w}, V ) as follows:
Candidate Score
c 8m(k + 1) + 8n
w 6m(k + 1) + 8n + 4k + 2
The candidate c will win with a margin of 2m(k + 1)− 4k − 2.
Additionally the scores in ({c, w} ∪B, V ) will be as follows:
Candidate Score
c 6m(k + 1) + 8n
w 6m(k + 1) + 4n + 4k + 2
b ∈ B ≤ 8 + 4m(k + 1)
Here, c will win with a margin of 4n− 4k− 2, which will be positive as
long as k < n.
w will be the winner of ({c, w}∪B′, V ) if and only if B′ ⊆ B is a hitting
set of size ≤ k.
Proof (→) The candidate w loses 4 points for each b ∈ B′ chosen, of
which there are no more than k. c loses 2(k + 1) points for each Si hit.
There will be m such sets if B′ is a hitting set, so they lose 2m(k +1) points
total.
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Candidate Score
c 6m(k + 1) + 8n
w ≥ 6m(k + 1) + 8n + 2
b ∈ B′ ≤ 8 + 4m(k + 1)
w will end up with an advantage of at least 2 points and therefore w
will be the winner of the election.
Proof (←) No B′ ⊆ B which is not a hitting set of size ≤ k will make w
the winner by adding those candidates. If B′ is a hitting set but |B′| > k, c
will have 6m(k + 1) + 8n points and w will have ≤ 6m(k + 1) + 8n. If B′
is not a hitting set c will have ≥ 6m(k + 1) + 8n + 2(k + 1) points and w
will have ≤ 6m(k + 1) + 8n + 2k + 2 points. In either case w will not be the
unique winner.
This construction can be used to create cases of constructive and de-
structive control by adding candidates and destructive control by adding
candidates. ((C, V ), (m−k), c) is such an instance of destructive control by
deleting candidates. (({c, w}, V ), k, c) is an instance of destructive control
by adding candidates, and (({c, w}, V ), k, w) is an instance of constructive
control by adding candidates. 
As in Erdélyi et al. this reduction is not sufficient to show resistance to
constructive control by deleting candidates as c and w are the only can-
didates with a shot at winning and deleting c will instantly make w the
winner. The remaining case can be handled by the following reduction.
We will again reduce from an instance of hitting set (B,S, k).
The candidate set C will consist of B ∪{w}, the set B from the instance
of hitting set together with an additional candidate.
The voter set V will be constructed as follows:
• n + k voters have a score of 2 for b for every b ∈ B, and a score of 0
for w.
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• 3 + 2mk voters have a score of 2 for w and a score of 0 for all other
candidates.
• For each S ∈ S, 4k + 1 voters have a score of 2 for s for every s ∈ S,
a score of 1 for each candidate in B − S, and a score of 0 for w.
• For each S ∈ S, 4k+1 voters have a score of 2 for b for every b ∈ B−S,
a score of 2 for w, and a score of 1 for s for every s ∈ S
• For each b ∈ B, 2n − k voters have a score of 2 for b, a score of 1 for
w, and a score of 0 for every other candidate.
w will be the winner of (B′ ∪ {w}, V ) if and only if B′ is a hitting set
over S of size no more than k or if B′ = ∅.
Proof (→): AssumeB′ is a hitting set and |B′| = k Each b ∈ B′ will receive
12mk + 4n− 2k + 4 points. w will receive 8mk + 6 + 4mk + 4(n− k) + 2k =
12mk + 4n− 2k + 6 points. Therefore w will be the winner in the election.
Proof (←): First assume B′ is a hitting set but |B′| = l > k. Since B′ is a
hitting set, every b ∈ B′ will receive exactly 12mk + 4n − 2k + 4 points. w
will receive 4mk + 6 + 8mk + 4(n − l) + 2l = 12mk + 4n − 2l + 4 points.
score(b) − score(w) = −2k + 2l − 2 which is non-negative since l > k.
Therefore w will lose the election.
Next consider the case where |B′| = l ≤ k but B′ is not a hitting set.
Therefore every b ∈ B′ will have a score ≥ 12nk + 4m− 2k + 4 + 4k as they
will gain an extra 4k points from one set of group 3 voters. w will have the
score 12nk + 4m− 2l + 6 Therefore score(b)− score(w) = 2k + 2l− 2 which
is non-negative and w will again lose the election.
An instance of hitting set (B,S, k) can thus be reduced to findingwhether
w can be made the winner of (C, V ) as above by deleting m−k candidates.

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4.3.4 Destructive Control by Partition of Voters
Theorem 4.3.5. 2-NRV is resistant to destructive control by partition of voters
in the ties-promote model.
We will reduce from restricted hitting set. Restricted hitting set is an
NP-complete hitting set variant introduced by Hemaspaandra et al. with
additional restrictions on the sizes of the sets in an instance [24]. The ver-
sion as used here has a slightly stronger bound which is necessary due to
the somewhat larger numbers required in this proof.
Given: A collection S of subsets of a set B, k ∈ Z+, with |S| = m, |B| = n,
and the additional restriction that m(k + 1) + 3 ≤ n− k
Question: Does B contain a hitting set B′ of size k or less that contains at
least one element from every S ∈ S?
Given an instance of restricted hitting set (B,S, k) with |B| = n and
|S| = m, create a 2-normalized-range election with C = B ∪ {w, c} and V
as follows.
• 2m(k+1)+4n voters have a score of 2 for c, and a score of 0 for every
other candidate.
• 3m(k + 1) + 2k voters have a score of 2 for w, and a score of 0 for
every other candidate.
• For each b ∈ B, 4 voters have a score of 2 for b, a score of 1 for w, and
a score of 0 for every other candidate.
• For each Si ∈ S, 2(k + 1) voters have a score of 2 for b, a score of 1 for
c, and a score of 0 for every other candidate.
• For each b ∈ B, 1 voter has a score of 2 for b and a score of 0 for every
other candidate.
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c can be made to lose (C, V ) through partition of voters if and only if
there is a hitting set of size ≤ k over S in B.
Proof (→) Given an appropriate hitting set B′, partition V into sets V1,
V2. Let V1 contains a voter from the final group corresponding to every
b ∈ B′ and one voter from the second group (allotting just 2 points to w)
and let V2 = V − V1. After the initial subelections, we will be left with w, c,
and the candidates B′ corresponding to the hitting set, and w will win this
election (see the reduction to adding/deleting candidates for the details of
that proof).
Proof (←) If there is no hitting set B′ ∈ B of size ≤ k, c cannot be made
to lose the election through partition of voters. For any actions attempting
to control the election by forcing the final candidate set, see the previous
reduction to adding/deleting candidates. As for other efforts concentrated
at more typically partitioning the voters, among the initial candidates, c
has as high of a score as any two other candidates, so they must at least tie
in at least one of the subelections and so they will always make it to the
final election. The scores of the candidates in the initial election follow.
Candidate Score
c 6m(k + 1) + 8n
w 6m(k + 1) + 4k + 4n
b ≤ 4m(k + 1) + 10
c’s score minus the next two highest scores will therefore be at least
4(n−k)−4m(k +1)−10. However, due to our use of restricted hitting set,
we have that m(k + 1) + 3 ≤ n − k, and so this is at least 2. Therefore the
only way to defeat c is to face them against a hitting set as described. 
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4.3.5 Partition of Candidates
Theorem 4.3.6. 4-NRV is resistant to constructive control by partition and
runoff partition of candidates
We will reduce from control by deletion of candidates in NRV. We will
show the reduction to constructive control by run-off partition, though the
other partition case quite similar.
Given an r-NRV election1 (C, V ) with |C| = m and |V | = n the distin-
guished candidate w ∈ C, and a deletion limit k ∈ N, construct a 2r-NRV
election (C ′, V ′) as follows. C ′ = C ∪ {a, b}, where a and b are additional
auxiliary candidates. V ′ will consist of the original voter set V in addition
to the following:
• For each c ∈ C, 2n voters have a score of 2r for c, a score of r for a,
and a score of 0 for every other candidate.
• For each c ∈ C∗, 3nm voters have a score of 2r for c and a score of 0
for every other candidate.
• 2nm voters have a score of 2r for w, a score of r for a, and a score of
0 for every other candidate.
• nm voters have a score of 2r for w and a score of 0 for every other
candidate.
• (m − k − 1)n voters have a score of 2r for all c ∈ C and a score of 0
for every other candidate.
• 2n + 1 voters have a score of 2r for a and a score of 0 for every other
candidate.
1Note that since k-NRV is resistant to deletion of candidates for k ≥ 2, this reduction
shows resistance for k ≥ 4
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• 3n+3nm+(m−k−1)n+2 voters have a score of 2r for b and a score
of 0 for every other candidate.
Let s0(c) be the score of candidate c among the original voters V . Note
for any candidate s0(c) ≤ nr.
The following are the scores for the candidates in (C ′, V ′) and various
relevant subelections thereof:
(C ′, V ′)
Candidate Score
a 4nmr + 4nr + 2r
b 6nr + 6nmr + 2(m− k − 1)nr + 4r
c ∈ C∗ 4nr + 6nmr + 2(m− k − 1)nr + 2s0(c)
w 4nr + 6nmr + 2(m− k − 1)nr + 2s0(w)
The winner in this case will be b.
({a, w}, V ′)
Candidate Score
a 4nr + 6nmr + 2
w 4nr + 6nmr + 2(m− k − 1)nr + 2s0(w)
The winner of this election will be w.
({w} ∪D,V ′) where D ⊆ C∗, |D| = l
Candidate Score
c ∈ D 4nr + 6nmr + 2(m− k − 1)nr + 2s0(c)
w 4nr + 6nmr + 2(m− k − 1)nr + 2s0(w)
The winner will again be whatever candidate is the winner over the
original voter set V .
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({a, b} ∪D,V ′) where D ⊆ C∗, |D| = l
Candidate Score
a 4nr + 6nmr + 2(m− l)nr + 2r
b 6nr + 6nmr + 2(m− k − 1)nr + 4r
c ∈ D 4nr + 6nmr + 2(m− k − 1)nr + 2s0(c)
In this election, a will be the winner whenever l ≤ k. Otherwise the
winner will be b.
({b, w}, V ′)
Candidate Score
b 6nr + 6nmr + 2(m− k − 1)nr + 4r
w 4nr + 6nmr + 2(m− k − 1)nr + 2s0(w)
In this case, b is the clear winner.
({a, w} ∪D,V ′) where D ⊆ C∗, |D| = l
Candidate Score
c ∈ D 4nr + 6nmr + 2(m− k − 1)nr + 2s0(c)
a 4nr + 4nmr + 2(m− l)nr + 2
w 4nr + 6nmr + 2(m− k − 1)nr + 2s0(w)
The winner will again be whatever candidate is the winner over the
original voter set V .
w can be made the winner of (C, V ) through deleting candidates if and
only if they can be made the winner of (C ′, V ′) through partition or runoff
partition of candidates.
Proof (→) Suppose w can be made the winner of (C, V ) through deleting
≤ k candidates. Let D be the set of candidates which were deleted in
the deletion problem. Partition the candidates into the subelections (D ∪
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{a, b}, V ′) and (C−D,V ′). a will win the first subelection as shown above.
w will win the second subelection, as it must if it is capable of winning
with the candidates in D deleted. The final election will then come down
to w and a, and as we see above, w will come out the victor. Alternately, in
the non-runoff partition case, let the initial subelection be (D cup{a, b}, V ′),
which a will win. The final election will come down to ({a, w}∪C−D,V ′),
which w will win.
Proof (←) Suppose w can be made the winner of the election (C ′, V ′)
through control by runoff partition of candidates. It must be that this
occurs through a partition of the form ({a.b} ∪ D, {w} ∪ (C∗ − D)) with
D ⊆ C∗, |D| ≤ k. b will always beat w, so they cannot face each other in
either the initial or final elections. The only candidate capable of beating
b is a when not in an election with w and when accompanied by no more
than k other candidates from C. w must also be able to defeat the remain-
ing m − k candidates. In the final election w will then face a and win, or
in the partition case a and C − D. Consequently w can also be made the
winner of (C, V ) by deleting k candidates.
The preceding construction will shows that NRV is resistant to con-
structive cases of partition of candidates. However it is not sufficient for
the destructive cases, as a winning candidate in the original election (C, V )
will not actually win in (C ′, V ′). Therefore we will present a new construc-
tion to handle the destructive cases.
Theorem 4.3.7. 2-NRV is resistant to destructive control by partition and runoff
partition of candidates.
We can reduce the Hitting set problem to the problem of destructive
control by partition of candidates. Let (B,S, k) be an instance of hitting set
where B = {b1, b2, . . . , bn}, S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sm}, Si ⊆ B, and k ∈ Z
+, k ≤
n.
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We will construct a 2-range election based on this instance. The candi-
date set C will consist of B ∪ {w}. The voter set V will be as follows.
• For each S ∈ S, 4(k + 1) voters have a score of 2 for each b ∈ S and a
score 1 for w
• For each S ∈ S, 4(k +1) voters have a score of 2 for each b ∈ B, b /∈ S,
and a score of 0 for every other candidate.
• For each b ∈ B, 4 voters have a score of 2 for b, a score of 1 for each
b′ ∈ B, b′ 6= b, and a score of 0 for w
• 2(k + 1)m + 4n − 2k + 1 voters have a score 2 for w and a score of 0
for every other candidate.
Again, we will first consider the outcome of several forms of subelec-
tions of this election.
(C, V )
Candidate Score
w 8(k + 1)m + 8n− 4k + 2
b ∈ B 8(k + 1)m + 4n + 4
w will win this election for any k ≤ n.
({w} ∪D,V ), D is a hitting set, |D| = l
Candidate Score
w 8(k + 1)m + 8n− 4k + 2
b ∈ B 8(k + 1)m + 8n− 4l + 4
If l ≤ k, every b ∈ B will tie for first with w as the clear loser. Otherwise
w will be the winner.
CHAPTER 4. RESULTS 49
({w} ∪D,V ), D is not a hitting set, |D| = l
Candidate Score
w 8(k + 1)m + 8n− 4k + 2 + 4(k + 1)
b ∈ B 8(k + 1)m + 8n− 4l + 4
w will win this election.
There is a hitting setB′ ⊂ B where |B′| ≤ k if and only ifw can bemade
to lose the election through partition or run-off partition of candidates.
Proof (→) If there is a hitting set B′ ⊂ B of size ≤ k, w will can be
made to lose the election through control by partition or runoff partition
of candidates with the partitions {w} ∪ B′, B − B′ w will lose the initial
subelection ({w} ∪ B′) as shown above, and will therefore lose the entire
election.
Proof (←) If there is no such hitting set, w cannot be made to lose the
election through partition or runoff partition of candidates. As shown
above, w will win any election ({w} ∪ B′, V ) where |B′| > k opponents,
or where their opponents do not comprise a hitting set. The one special
case is when k = n, where w will lose the original election but in this case
there is a hitting set by default, so this problem should also always accept.
Thereforew will win against any subset ofB, so they will win both any ini-
tial subelection and the final election, and so there is no partition to make
them lose. 
4.3.6 Missing Case
One case of control for NRV, destructive control by partition of voters in
the ties-eliminate model, remains open. The polynomial time algorithm
previously described for this case of control for RV will not work, as a can-
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didate can potentially lose an election a different way than that algorithm
can find. Still, even with this case open NRV has at least as many control
resistances as any other natural system.
4.4 Manipulation
RV is vulnerable to manipulation. The simple and transparent scoring rule
in range voting makes the manipulation problem very easy. To make their
preferred candidate the winner, the set of manipulators can do no better
than to give that candidate the maximum score possible and to give every
other candidate the minimum score possible (0). If this is enough to make
the distinguished candidate win it is possible and otherwise not. Since
manipulation does not involve changes to the candidate set, the same al-
gorithm will work for NRV as well as RV. Thus manipulation is clearly in
P for both RV and NRV. 
4.5 Bribery
RV is resistant to bribery. This result trivially follows from approval vot-
ing, which is already known to hold this resistance [15]. As before, we
can just reduce from an instance of approval bribery to a 1-range or 1-
normalized-range electionwhich is exactly equivalent to the approval elec-
tion, and so RV and NRV hold this resistance as well. 
Chapter 5
Future Work
This work leaves open a number of questions. Clearly, it is desirable to
resolve the one missing case of NRV and find whether it is the uniquely
most resistant natural voting system to control. Regardless, NRV still does
come short of resistance to all cases of control, so some other natural sys-
tem could still best it. Just as useful would be results about the conditions
that are required for a voting system to hold various resistances. It may
still be that natural systems are incapable of holding every control resis-
tance simultaneously. Any useful results here would first require a formal-
ization of what exactly a natural voting system is. Most desirable would
be a reasonable set of conditions which could be shown to be incompatible
with holding all resistances simultaneously, à la Arrow’s Theorem.
Other useful work would be to analyze methods for sidestepping the
worst-case difficulty of the control problems here. For instance, the use
approximation algorithms as by Baumeister et al. [7], or analysis of the
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